SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN UNITED STATES AND NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States and New Jersey Supreme Court cases of interest to
practitioners. In so doing we hope to assist the legal community in

keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant
areas of practice.
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FEDERAL JURISDICTION-HABEAs CORPUS-IN ORDER TO ExHAUST STATE REMEDIES,

HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONERS MUST

HAvE

OF STATE

FRAMED

APPEALS

EVIDENTIARY

RULINGS

IN

TERMS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONs-Duncan v.

Henry, 115 S. Ct. 887 (1995).
Robert E. Henry worked as both a rector and a dean in a
church day school. 115 S. Ct. 887, 887 (1995). In state court,
Henry was tried and convicted of the sexual molestation of a student. At trial, Henry objected to the admission of testimony by
another student's parent who claimed to have also been molested
by Henry twenty years previously. Henry's objection was based on
§ 352 of the California Code of Evidence, which is used to determine if an error is harmless.
On direct appeal, Henry asked the appellate court to conclude
that the trial court's error resulted in a miscarriage ofjustice pursuant to the California Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). The appellate court determined that the error was harmless and affirmed
Henry's conviction. Id. (citation omitted).
Respondent then petitioned the United States District Court,
Central District of California, requesting a writ of habeas corpus on
the grounds that the evidentiary error denied him the constitutional right to due process of law. Id. The district court granted
Henry's petition, and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. Id. (citation omitted). The circuit court concluded that
Henry had exhausted all of his available state remedies, despite the
fact that he had never alleged a violation of a federal constitutional
right during the state proceedings. Id. at 887-88 (citation omitted).
The Ninth Circuit suggested that requiring litigants to frame appeals of state evidentiary decisions in terms of the due process
clause of the federal constitution would be superfluous. Id. at 888
(citation omitted).
In a per curiam opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit. Id. The Justices first recognized that the Court has long held that to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement, petitioners must fairly present the state courts with
an opportunity to pass upon any alleged violations of a prisoner's
federal constitutional rights. Id. (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270, 275 (1971)). To do this, the Court noted, prisoners must first
make the state court aware that they are in fact asserting claims
under the federal constitution. Id. It is not enough, the Justices
posited, to raise the issue of a federal due process violation result1334
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ing from an evidentiary decision only in federal court. Id. (citing
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982)).
Premising its decision on Picardand Harless, the Justices concluded that Henry did not inform the state appellate court that the
evidentiary ruling he complained of was both a state law and Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id. This error, the Court stated, was
especially pronounced because Henry had in fact raised before the
state court a due process objection based upon a different claim.
Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, the Justices posited, the state
court of appeals reviewed the evidentiary error by determining
whether its prejudicial effect was greater than its probative value,
rather than whether the error was inflammatory and prevented a
fair trial. Id. (citation omitted). The majority noted that the dissent in the Ninth Circuit, authored by Judge Brunetti, correctly
concluded that these two standards are only somewhat similar. Id.
(citation omitted). The exhaustion requirement, the Court posited, cannot be satisfied by a mere similarity of claims. Id. (citing
Picard,404 U.S. at 276; Harless, 459 U.S. at 6). Therefore, the Justices noted, when presented with Henry's claim of error pursuant
to the California Evidentiary Code, the state court naturally confined the analysis to state law. Id. Upon these facts, the Justices
granted Henry's petition for certiorari, and reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment. Id.
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, concurred with the majority's decision. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
The Justice noted that the majority correctly recognized that respondent Henry's appeal in state court was limited to the state law
prejudice issue. Id. Consequently, the concurrence posited, pursuant to Picard,the state courts were never fairly presented with the
federal due process claim. Id. (citation omitted).
In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the rule of law set out by
the majority represents a substantial departure from the Court's
prior holdings. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Justice opined
that a new rule of law should never be announced without first
hearing oral argument on the issue. Id. The Court's opinion, Justice Stevens suggested, is especially distressing because it sets forth
an exacting pleading requirement which serves no purpose within
our habeas corpus jurisprudence. Id.
In Picard,the dissent noted, the Court's opinion carefully explained that state prisoners must exhaust all available state-court
remedies before federal courts would consider habeas corpus applications. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stevens reiterated the
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Court's holding that the exhaustion requirement can only be satisfied when criminal defendants fairly present their federal claims to
the state courts. Id. (citing Picard, 404 U.S. at 275) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent opined, however, that in Picardthe Court
clearly stated that prisoners do not have to place the correct label
upon their claim, or cite the Federal Constitution, so long as the
federal claim in substance has been fairly presented. Id. Justice
Stevens posited that in this conclusion, the Court recognized that
their would be instances where despite differences in factual allegations or legal theory the ultimate question for resolution will be the
same. Id. at 889 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting). An
example, the dissent noted, is where a confession is predicated on
physical as well as psychological coercion. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens asserted that until the majority's decision, prisoners
were not required to exhaust federal claims by citing specific provisions of the federal constitution. Id. (citation omitted). The traditional rule, the Justice explained, has merely required that
defendants present the substance of federal habeas corpus claims
in state court. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens posited that the Court's opinion heightens the
pleading requirements by making litigants alert the state courts
that they are asserting federal constitutional claims. Id. (citation
omitted). The Justice noted that despite the majority's reliance on
Picardand Harless, neither case is on point. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens noted that in both case the Court stated that the
substance of the federal and state claims were different. Id. In addition, the Justice noted that while the dissent disagreed with the
conclusion reached in Harless, what was most disturbing about the
Court's opinion was the labeling requirement. Id. (citation
omitted).
Moreover, Justice Stevens posited that none of the appellate
courts had reached a similar understanding of Harlessor Picard. Id.
To the contrary, the dissent noted, circuit court decisions had analyzed the exhaustion requirement without rigidly insisting that prisoners invoke the specific language of the federal constitution. Id.
(citations omitted).
The majority's new rule, the Justice opined, is both
hypertechnical and unwise. Id. Justice Stevens propounded that
the Court's opinion will result in prolonged litigation without serving a valid purpose. Id. The dissent stated that preventing needless litigation helps both the judicial system and incarcerated
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individuals, despite having meritorious federal claims. Id. (citation
omitted).
Furthermore, Justice Stevens declared, the Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed the issue of exhaustion. Id. On the merits, the Justice opined, Henry presented a federal due process claim by stating
that the testimony of one of the prosecution's witnesses was so irrelevant and inflammatory that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. Id. Justice Stevens agreed that Henry had raised the
issue of the admission of the testimony on direct appeal while in
state court. Id. at 890 (citation omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
To be sure, the dissent propounded, Henry's appellate brief cited
only state law. Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Justice
stated, the Ninth Circuit carefully explained that the standards for
addressing Henry's state law claim were identical to the analysis
applied on habeas review in federal court. Id. (citation omitted).
Consequently, Justice Stevens posited, the Ninth Circuit correctly
concluded that Henry had exhausted his claims. Id.
Finally, the dissent noted that the majority mischaracterized
Judge Brunetti's dissent in the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 891 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting). Judge Brunetti, the Justice posited, concluded that the
exhaustion requirement had not been satisfied because the state
and federal claims where subject to different standards of review.
Id. (citations omitted). The majority, Justice Stevens concluded,
should not terminate thoughtful debate amongst the Circuit
judges by announcing a new rule. Id. If the standards of Picard
and Harless are to be discarded, the dissent opined, the Court
should do so only after being fully briefed by written and oral argument. Id.
From a logicians perspective, the courts decision in Henry
makes perfect sense. Premise one, the habeas corpus statute, was
enacted to provide criminal defendants a means to test judicially
the legality of their detention by government authority. Premise
two, section 2254 (A), authorizes the federal district courts to issue
a writ for those prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, provided they assert that the judgment is in conflict with the
federal constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Premise
three, before issuance of said writs, it must appear that the applicant has exhausted his available state remedies by giving state
courts the opportunity to pass upon the federal claims, or show
cause as to why such a process would prove ineffective. Therefore,
it follows that a criminal defendant who has not made the state
court aware that he asserts a claim under the federal constitution
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or law or treaties of the United States, and does not claim that such
a process would prove futile, has not exhausted his state remedies.
Justice Stevens' dissent, while understandably critical of the
Court's form over substance position, is illogical. Justice Stevens
would argue that it follows from premises one, two, and three, that
despite failing to assert a federal claim, the exhaustion requirement has been satisfied so long as a litigant's state claim is similar
in substance to his federal constitutional claim.
Aside from its logistical flaws, however, Justice Stevens' dissent
also fails to adequately confront the essential purpose of granting
habeas relief. In permitting state litigants to have their federal
claims reviewed by the federal courts, we assume that the state
courts have been given adequate opportunity to first pass upon the
merits of those claims. To argue that state courts have in essence
passed upon those claims simply because the state cause of action,
in substance, is similar to the federal, overlooks the importance
with which the specter of federal review plays upon the state courts
substantive determinations.
Michael Ben-David

INSURANCE LAW-NEWJERSEY AUTOMOBILE REPARATION REFORM
ACT-STATUTE PROHIBITING STACKING OF BASIC PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION RECOVERY DOES NOT APPLY TO EXTENDED
MEDICAL-EXPENSE
POLICIES WHEN STACKING WOULD NOT

EXPENSES-Ingersoll v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 138 N.J. 236, 649 A.2d 1269
(1994).
ACHIEVE DOUBLE RECOVERY OF MEDICAL

In October of 1987, the plaintiff Brain Lihou, while riding his
brother's motorcycle, was involved in an automobile accident. 138
N.J. 236, 237, 649 A.2d 1269, 1269-70 (1994). Brian, whose automobile was insured with the NewJersey Full Automobile Insurance
Underwriting Association ("JUA"), sustained injuries and acquired
medical bills exceeding $35,000.
Brian was not able to recover for his medical expenses pursu-
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ant to his basic personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage on the
JUA automobile policy because he was operating a motorcycle at
the time of the accident. Id. at 238, 649 A.2d at 1270. Due to a
regulation enacted by the Commissioner of Insurance, however,
Brian was able to recover under the extended medical-expense
benefits portion of his policy. Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:37.3(b)). This provision of the policy, which extended coverage for
motorcycle accidents, only allowed Brian to recover $10,000, the
maximum amount available under the policy.
In order to mitigate a portion of his remaining outstanding
medical expenses, Brian attempted to recover under a similar extended medical-expense benefits provision of his mother's automobile policy. His mother's policy, issued by the Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. ("Aetna"), would provide up to $10,000 of coverage for
motorcycle accidents to relatives living in the same household as
the policy holder. Aetna, however, denied coverage based on the
NewJersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act's anti-stacking provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:62-4.2, which prohibits double recovery
of PIP benefits. In denying coverage, Aetna reasoned that the antistacking provision applied not only to basic PIP benefits, but also
to extended medical-expense benefits.
Brian sued Aetna in order to recover the $10,000 maximum
amount available under the extended medical-expense benefits
provision of his mother's policy. The New Jersey Superior Court,
Law Division, granted Aetna's motion for summary judgment. Id.
(citation omitted). Subsequently, the appellate division affirmed,
relying on the anti-stacking statute as well as the language of the
Aetna policy. Id. (citation omitted).
The NewJersey Supreme Court granted certification to decide
whether the stacking prohibition applied to extended medical-expense benefits as it did to basic PIP benefits. Id. at 237, 649 A.2d at
1269 (citation omitted). In an unanimous opinion, reversing the
appellate division, the court held that the anti-stacking provision
does not apply to extended medical-expense benefits. Id. at 239,
649 A.2d at 1270.
In a per curiam opinion, the court began by analyzing the
anti-stacking provision of the No-Fault Law. Id. at 238-39, 649 A.2d
at 1270. The justices, relying on the legislative history of the New
Jersey Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment Act of 1984, explained that the legislature intended the
Act to limit eligibility for PIP coverage. Id. at 239, 649 A.2d at 1270
(citation omitted). Along these lines, the court also noted that the
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No-Fault Law, formerly unlimited as to PIP coverage, now contains
a $250,000 cap on those benefits. Id. (citation omitted).
The justices continued the analysis by explaining that the extended medical benefits were not established by statute, but rather
by a regulation created by the Commissioner of Insurance. Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE 11:3-7.3(b)). That regulation, the court announced, orders that every New Jersey automobile policy contain a
provision for extended medical-expense benefits. Id. Additionally,
the court explained, the extended medical- expense benefits provision of the Aetna policy is almost identical to that of the JUA policy. Id., 649 A.2d at 1271.
Under the extended medical-expense benefits provision, the
court continued, Aetna is bound to pay up to $10,000 to injured
insured operators of highway vehicles, which include motorcycles,
who are not covered by basic PIP benefits. Id. at 239-40, 649 A.2d
at 1271. Thus, the justices concluded that the extended benefits
provision applies only to a small class of persons who are not eligible for the basic PIP maximum benefit of $250,000. Id. at 240, 649
A.2d at 1271. Also, the court recognized that the Commissioner
enacted the medical-expense regulation in order to protect that
small class who is injured while operating highway vehicles such as
motorcycles. Id. Additionally, the court noted that the Aetna policy makes clear the differences between basic PIP coverage and extended medical coverage. Id.
The justices, however, acknowledged that the format of the
Aetna policy created some confusion because it appeared that the
anti-stacking provision applied to both basic PIP and extended
medical-expense benefits. Id. at 240-41, 649 A.2d at 1271. The
court contended, however, that the differences between the two
types of coverage are significant enough to show that the legislative
intent was not to bar stacking of extended benefits, but only basic
PIP benefits. Id. at 241, 649 A.2d at 1271.
Subsequently, the court asserted that the appellate division's
reading of the anti-stacking provision misinterpreted the policy's
purpose of barring double recovery. Id., 649 A.2d at 1271-72. The
justices explained that the insured's ability to recover was not
barred, but limited to the extent that he or she recovers under
another policy. Id., 649 A.2d at 1272. Therefore, the court reasoned, public policy concerns mandate that Brian is eligible to recover under the Aetna policy because he only recovered $10,000 of
his $35,000 loss from another policy. Id. at 241, 649 A.2d at 1272.
Accordingly, the justices held, Brian would not be recovering twice
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for the same injury, but instead he would still have $15,000 of unrecovered medical expenses. Id. at 242, 649 A.2d at 1272. Thus, the
court reversed and remanded, holding that requiring Aetna to pay
$10,000 would not result in double recovery. In addition, the justices asserted that the holding would not violate public policy, legislative intent, or the Commissioner's goals. Id. Lastly, the court
noted that the Legislature possesses the ultimate authority to correct this interpretation of the Act if it is so inclined. Id.
Despite the fact that the Legislature provided only sparse history for the court to reference in determining legislative intent, the
court chose the only sensible reading of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act. That is, the court's opinion recognizes the New Jersey Legislature's desire to protect insureds who
are injured while operating highway vehicles, yet are not eligible
for up to $250,000 in basic PIP medical benefits. The court's interpretation, however, keeps in mind the goals of the anti-stacking
provision. The court, in distinguishing between basic PIP benefits
and extended medical-expense benefits, articulates the only fair interpretation of a potentially inequitable statute, and in turn, represents the interests of the parties in the most equitable manner.
Stacy A. Dowling

INSURANCE-PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS-INSURED
INJURED IN A RANDOM DRIVE-BY SHOOTING IS ENTITLED TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS BECAUSE SUCH A SHOOTING
IS A FORESEEABLE ACCIDENT WHICH

IS SUBSTANTIALLY CON-

AUTOMOBILE-Lindstrom v. Hanover
Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 242, 649 A.2d 1272 (1994).
NECTED TO THE USE OF AN

On April 15, 1989, Kurt Lindstrom was the victim of a random
drive-by shooting. 138 N.J. at 244, 649 A.2d at 1273. While attending an outdoor party at the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, Kurt was struck by a bullet which pierced his spinal column,
rendering him a quadriplegic. Subsequently, Kurt sought personal
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injury protection benefits [hereinafter "PIP benefits"] from the defendant, Hanover Insurance Company.
The defendant had issued an automobile insurance policy to
Kurt's father, George K. Lindstrom, which covered Kurt as a member of his father's household. Consequently, Kurt's father sought
recovery under that policy for Kurt's medical expenses and essential services. Id. at 245, 649 A.2d at 1273. The defendant ultimately
refused payment and the Lindstroms sued the insurance company
to recover PIP benefits under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 [hereinafter "section four"].
Denying the Lindstroms' motion for summary judgment, the
trial court ruled that the nexus between the injury and the automobile was insufficient to justify the application of PIP coverage. Id.
Accordingly, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant, whereupon the Lindstroms' appealed. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed
the trial court's holding. Id., 649 A.2d at 1274. Reasoning that the
automobile at issue was merely an "attending circumstance" to
Kurt's injuries, and noting that the parties to the insurance contract did not contemplate that shootings would be covered by the
insurance policy, the appellate division concluded that the shooting was not sufficiently connected to the automobile to bring Kurt
within the protections afforded by section four. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the appellate court's ruling. Id. at 253, 649 A.2d at 1277.
The supreme court held that an insured injured in a random driveby shooting is entitled to PIP benefits because such a shooting is a
foreseeable accident which is substantially connected to the use of
an automobile. Id. at 251-53, 649 A.2d at 1277.
Writing for the majority, Justice Clifford set the stage for the
court's analysis by noting that section four's "substantial nexus" requirement is the applicable standard in PIP cases involving familymember pedestrians. Id. at 246, 649 A.2d at 1274 (citing Smaul v.
Irvington GeneralHosp., 108 N.J. 474, 477-78, 530 A.2d 1251 (1987)).
Explaining, the court asserted that the language of section four
unmistakably conditions PIP recovery on proof of causation. Id.
Therefore, the court reasoned, application of the substantial-nexus
test is a necessary safeguard to a proper section four analysis. Id.
Next, the majority noted the defendant's reliance on Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. ContinentalIns. Co., which intimated that the substantial nexus requirement would not be met in the case of a
random drive-by shooting. Id. at 246-47, 649 A.2d at 1274 (citing
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Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. ContinentalIns. Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 40,
312 A.2d 664 (App. Div. 1973), affd o.b., 65 N.J. 152, 319 A.2d 732
(1974)). According to the defendant, Justice Clifford observed,
the court's dicta in Westchester mandated the majority's rejection of
the Lindstroms' claim. Id. at 247, 649 A.2d at 1274.
Having laid the foundation for the majority opinion, Justice
Clifford began the court's analysis by examining the underlying basic principles of statutory interpretation. Id. New Jersey's no-fault
compulsory automobile-insurance scheme, the justice stated, must
be liberally construed and given broad application so as to further
the public policy favoring PIP coverage as a "social necessity." Id.,
649 A.2d at 1274-75 (citing Darelv. PennsylvaniaMfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co.,
114 N.J. 416, 425, 555 A.2d 570 (1989)) (other quotations and citations omitted). Consequently, the majority imparted, an insured is
entitled to coverage when the expectation of coverage is objectively
reasonable and supported by fair legal interpretation. Id. (citations omitted).
The court further noted that the Legislature intended to ensure broad coverage in all instances which involved an automobile.
Id. at 248, 649 A.2d at 1275 (citation omitted). Therefore, the
court concluded that where statutory linguistics encompass a particular incident, it is irrelevant that the incident may not have been
specifically contemplated by the Legislature. Id. (citing Sheeran v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. 548, 556, 404 A.2d 625 (1979))
(quotation omitted).
Tracing the legislative history of section four, Justice Clifford
concluded that the statute was designed to provide insureds with
the broadest possible protection. Id. at 248-49, 249 A.2d at 1275
(quotations and citations omitted). Although a 1983 amendment
to the statute limited PIP recovery to cases in which the victim was
struck by an automobile itself, the justice noted that the Legislature later eliminated that restriction and extended coverage to
those pedestrians who are struck by an object propelled from an
automobile. Id. at 248, 649 A.2d at 1275 (quotations omitted).
Although acknowledging that PIP coverage will not extend to circumstances in which an automobile is merely a setting for the accident, the majority observed that none of the section four
amendments altered the guiding principle behind the statute's enactment: insured protection. Id. at 249, 649 A.2d at 1275. Therefore, Justice Clifford asserted, section four must continue to be
liberally construed and broadly applied so to afford coverage
where possible. Id.

1344

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1334

Justice Clifford buttressed this conclusion by illustrating that
courts interpreting section four have assigned a broad definition to
the word "accident." Id., 649 A.2d at 1275-76. Relying on relevant
case law which holds that the existence of an accident is determined according to the victim's perspective, the majority concluded that an intentionally-inflicted injury may constitute an
"accident" for PIP purposes. Id., 649 A.2d at 1275-76 (citing Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Estate of Miller, 185 N.J. Super.
183, 188, 447 A.2d 1344 (App. Div. 1982)) (quotation omitted).
The court next proffered that the proper standard for determining whether the automobile was substantially connected to the
accident is that which was developed in Westchester Fire Ins. Co.. Id.
at 250, 649 A.2d at 1276 (citing Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 126 N.J.
Super. at 38, 312 A.2d at 664) (other citation omitted). According
to Westchester, Justice Clifford remarked, the substantial nexus test is
satisfied if the injurious act is, in the contemplation of the parties,
a natural incident of the use of an automobile and is therefore,
although not specifically foreseeable, a risk from which the insured
reasonably expected to be protected. Id. (quotation and citation
omitted). The justice further recognized that neither direct nor
proximate cause is required to satisfy the test. Id. at 251, 649 A.2d
at 1276 (citation omitted). Justice Clifford noted that the test is
not satisfied, however, unless the accident is a reasonable consequence of the use of an automobile and is within the contemplation of the parties. Id. Illustrating, the justice noted three
appellate division rulings in which the court denied PIP benefits.
Id., 649 A.2d at 1276-77 (citations omitted). First, Justice Clifford
remarked that the appellate division had denied PIP coverage in a
case in which the victim had been fatally stabbed after alighting
from an insured's automobile. Id., 649 A.2d at 1276 (citing Vasil v.
Zullo, 238 N.J. Super. 572, 577, 570 A.2d 464 (App. Div. 1990)).
Denying PIP coverage, Justice Clifford observed, the Vasil court
reasoned that physical or verbal confrontations with the occupant
of another vehicle does not constitute natural use of an automobile. Id. (quotation omitted).
Second, the Lindstrom majority asserted that the appellate division had similarly declined to extend PIP benefits where an insured was fatally shot while sitting in her automobile. Id., 649 A.2d
at 1276-77 (citing Morgan v. PrudentialIns. Co., 242 N.J. Super. 638,
642, 577 A.2d 1300 (App. Div.), certif denied, 122 NJ. 370, 585 A.2d
377 (1990)). Finally, Justice Clifford noted that the appellate division denied PIP coverage in a case where an insured, while using a
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public telephone, was fatally shot by thieves who were attempting
to steal the insured's car. Id. (citing Uzcatequi-Gaymon v. New Jersey
Mfrs. Ins. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 71, 73, 472 A.2d 163 (App. Div.
1984)).
Guided by the foregoing principles, the court applied the substantial nexus test to the facts in Lindstrom. Id. Justice Clifford began by proclaiming that, under section four, the random drive-by
shooting was indeed an "accident." Id. at 251-52, 649 A.2d at 1277.
As the justice explained, the shooting was unintentional from
Kurt's perspective. Id.
Next, Justice Clifford rejected the appellate division's contention that because the bullet was propelled from the gun, rather
than from the car, the connection between the automobile and the
injury was too attenuated to satisfy the substantial nexus test developed in Westchester. Id. at 252, 649 A.2d at 1277. As the justice
explained, rather than serving as a mere setting for the accident,
the automobile was a necessary factor in the completion of the assault, because the car provided the assailants with both anonymity
and a mode of escape. Id.
Turning to the issue of foreseeability, the court concluded
that Kurt's injury was foreseeable because the assault was related to
the use of an automobile which was, in fact, a central factor in the
crime. Id. (citing Smaul, 108 N.J. at 478, 530 A.2d at 1251). Distinguishing Vasil, the majority noted that in the instant case, the assailant had not left his car for a purpose unrelated to the forward
motion of the vehicle. Id. (citing Vasil, 238 N.J. Super. at 572, 570
A.2d at 464). Moreover, the court noted regretfully that the increasing occurrence of drive-by shootings in today's society rendered those incidents foreseeable in the common American scene.
Id. at 252-53, 649 A.2d at 1277.
Finally, recognizing the potential abuse that could stem from
construing section four as a general crime insurance provision, the
majority limited the Lindstrom holding to random drive-by shootings. Id. at 253, 649 A.2d at 1277. Justice Clifford averred that an
insured should not be deprived of PIP benefits merely because the
accident involved an intentional criminal act. Id. (citation
omitted).
Dissenting, Justice Pollock, joined byJustices O'Hern and Garibaldi, contended that the majority disregarded the legislative intent behind section four, erroneously shifted the risk of loss from
an insured to an insurer, and blatantly ignored the fact that the
bullet in the instant case was propelled from a gun rather than
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from. an automobile. Id., 649 A.2d at 1277-78 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Illustrating those contentions, the dissenting justice listed numerous similar situations which the court might be forced to
address, and questioned the propriety of applying the Lindstrom
holding to those scenarios. Id. at 253-54, 649 A.2d at 1278 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice posited that the Legislature did
not intend section four to extend to the illustrated situations or to
the instant case. Id. The justice opined that in the hypothetical
situations, as in the case at bar, the automobile merely provided a
setting for the act. Id. Furthermore, the dissent averred, it is
doubtful that a reasonable insured would expect PIP benefits to
extend to injuries resulting from a random drive-by shooting. Id.
In addition, the dissent criticized the majority for interpreting
section four to encompass such circumstances. Id. Specifically, the
dissent chastised the majority for allowing statutory linguistics to
trump legislative intent. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Agreeing with the majority, however, Justice Pollock remarked
that the substantial nexus test is the appropriate standard for determining proper application of PIP coverage under section four. Id.
at 256, 649 A.2d at 1279 (Pollack, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted, however, that a substantial nexus between the automobile
and the injury did not exist in the instant case. Id. The dissent
admonished the majority for concluding that the automobile was
central to the assault merely because it provided the assailant with
anonymity and a mode of escape. Id. (quotation omitted). Such a
broad conclusion, the dissent cautioned, would enable future insureds to avail themselves of PIP benefits in any case where their
assailant used an automobile as a means of escape or anonymity.
Id. Although such coverage could be provided by statute, the justice opined that this was not the intent of the Legislature in enacting section four. Id.
Furthermore, the dissent noted that absent supporting statistics, drive-by shootings could not be characterized as a frequent
occurrence in today's society or a common use of automobiles. Id.
(quotations omitted). Concluding, the dissent maintained that because Kurt Lindstrom was injured by a bullet shot from a gun, the
relationship between Kurt's injuries and the assailant's automobile
was too attenuated to warrant application of PIP coverage under
section four. Id.
By applying the substantial nexus test to the determination of
PIP coverage, the court employed the most effective and accurate
means of proportioning recovery. The substantial nexus test safe-
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guards the goals of insurance recovery: to protect innocent insureds when warranted and to prevent fraud. Furthermore, by
affording recovery when the test is satisfied, the court acted consistent with the public policy favoring the insured and requiring
broad application of NewJersey's no-fault compulsory automobileinsurance scheme.
The majority's analysis of whether a drive-by shooting qualifies
as an "accident" caused by an object propelled by or from an automobile is notable because it rejects the argument put forth by the
defendant, the appellate division, and the dissent: because bullets
are propelled from guns rather than automobiles, drive-by shootings should be excluded from PIP coverage. That distinction is
trivial and far-reaching and will unjustly exclude viable claims. Additionally, the court was mindful that the guiding principle behind
section four was to find coverage if a fair interpretation of the law
would allow it. Also, the majority's approach comports with the
current trend of insurance reform. An insured that is innocently
wounded as a result of another's criminal activity while utilizing an
automobile should be afforded protection. Moreover, the insurance company is in the best position to bear the risk of loss in such
circumstances. Therefore, the court's decision to extend PIP coverage in cases of random drive-by shootings is in accordance with
both the law and public policy.
Kristina K. Pappa

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRISONERS' RiGHTS-THE HARMLESSERROR RULE APPLIES TO A HEARING OFFICER'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PRISONER WITH THE REQUISITE

24

HOURS TO PREPARE

FOR A DISCIPLINARY HEARING SO LONG AS THE PRISONER HAS

NOT BEEN PREJUDICED-Jacobs

v. Stephens, 1995 WL 29336

(N.J. Jan. 25, 1995).
On September 14, 1992, AI-Tariq Jacobs, a New Jersey state
prison inmate, and Corrections Officer Hawkins had a heated argument in which Jacobs allegedly threatened Hawkins. Id. at *1.
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Consequently, Hawkins filed a disciplinary report charging Jacobs
with "threatening another with bodily harm" and placed Jacobs in
pre-hearing detention. At 10:30 a.m. the following day, Jacobs received a copy of the report and, twenty-two and one-half hours
later, Jacobs' disciplinary hearing was held. Concluding that Jacobs had indeed threatened Hawkins, the hearing officer sentenced Jacobs accordingly. Id. at *2.
Both an Assistant Superintendent of Corrections and the Administrator of Northern State Prison upheld the hearing officer's
conclusions andJacobs appealed. Id. Affirming, the appellate division determined that the hearing officer's decision was supported
by the record. Id.
Subsequently, Jacobs petitioned the New Jersey Supreme
Court for certification, claiming that his disciplinary hearing violated both Department of Corrections [hereinafter "DOC"] regulations and his constitutional right to procedural due process. Id. at
*1. Specifically, Jacobs maintained that his hearing violated section 10A:4-9.2 of the New Jersey Administrative Code [hereinafter
the "Code"], which entitles an inmate to 24 hours prior to a hearing to prepare a defense [hereinafter "24-hour rule"]. Id. at *1, *2.
Jacobs further asserted that he was denied the right to both call
and confront witnesses, in violation of Code sections 1OA:4-9.13(a)
and 10:A4-9.14a. Id. at *1. Finally, Jacobs claimed that the evidence against him was insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed. Id. at *2, *6. Finding thatJacobs had not been prejudiced,
the court held that the hearing officer's failure to provide Jacobs
with 24 hours in which to prepare a defense was harmless error
which did not entitle Jacobs to a vacation of the hearing officer's
determination. Id. at *4. Modifying DOC disciplinary hearing procedures, however, the court held that inmates in future cases must
sign an amended Adjudication Form which will inform them of
their right to remain silent, to make statements regarding the
charges, to obtain "use immunity," and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at *5 (citing McDonald v. Pinchak, 1995 WL
29341 (N.J. January 25, 1995); Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 341
A.2d 629 (1975)). To facilitate prisoners' right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, the court suggested that the DOC promulgate a regulation to allow inmate defendants to receive witness
statements where such disclosure would not compromise prison
safety. Id. Finally, the court concluded that when the nature of an
inmate's words reasonably convey the fear of death to an ordinary,
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objective listener, then such words constitute a threat of bodily
harm under DOC regulations. Id. at *6 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 10AA-4.1 (a) *005).
Writing for the majority, Justice Garibaldi began the court's
analysis by noting the evolution of state and federal law regarding
prisoners' due process claims. Id. at *2. Specifically, the justice addressed New Jersey's adoption of the 24-hour rule established by
the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnelL Id. (citing
Wolff v. McDonnelI, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Avant, 67 N.J. at 496, 341
A.2d at 629). In Woff Justice Garibaldi observed, the Court held
that an inmate, after receiving written notice of an impending disciplinary hearing, should be given at least 24 hours to prepare a
defense. Id. (citing Woff 418 U.S. at 565). The Jacobs majority further noted that NewJersey adopted Wolffs 24-hour standard nearly
verbatim in Avant. Id. (citing Avant, 67 N.J. at 496, 341 A.2d at
629). Justice Garibaldi stated that although the 24-hour rule was
initially quasi-mandatory and quasi-discretionary, the rule has been
amended and codified at section 10A:4-9.2 of the Code to provide
that an inmate must be given a copy of the disciplinary report at
least 48 hours after the incident and must be afforded at least 24
hours to prepare a defense. Id. (quotation omitted).
Having established that the 24-hour standard applied in New
Jersey, the majority conceded that Jacobs' hearing, held approximately twenty-two and one-half hours after he was given notice of
the hearing, was in violation of the 24-hour rule. Id. at *2, *3.
Although noting the hearing officer's sworn statement indicating
that he was unaware of the violation and that neitherJacobs nor his
counsel substitute had requested additional time to prepare, Justice Garibaldi emphasized that deviation from this rule should be
allowed only in "extreme circumstances." Id. at *3. Clarifying, Justice Garibaldi proclaimed that neither an inmate's failure to request a postponement or additional time to prepare a defense, nor
a hearing officer's simple neglect to ensure compliance with the
24-hour rule, constitutes an "extreme circumstance." Id. Nonetheless, the majority determined that the evidence against Jacobs was
"overwhelming" and that the DOC's error was therefore harmless.
Id.
Expounding upon its finding that the DOC's error was harmless, the court explained that harmless-error analysis typically applies to the denial of those rights which are afforded defendants to
facilitate their defense. Id. (citations omitted). In contrast, Justice
Garibaldi remarked, is the denial of those rights which are deemed
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essential to a fair trial. Id. (citations omitted). According to Justice
Garibaldi, harmless-error analysis of a violation of the 24-hour rule
requires a two-tier approach. Id. (citation omitted). First, the justice asserted, the court must examine the regulations to determine
whether the inmate's due process rights are protected. Id. (citation omitted). Next, the majority declared, if the court concludes
that the regulations are sufficiently protective, the court must examine any prejudice alleged by the inmate. Id. (citation omitted).
Once the court has balanced the above concerns, Justice Garibaldi reasoned, the court should be reluctant to hinder prison officials' administration of the disciplinary procedures by requiring an
automatic remand for technical non-compliance with a regulation
in the absence of any prejudice to the inmate. Id. (quotation and
other citations omitted). Concluding that the 24-hour rule was not
essential to the fairness of Jacobs' disciplinary hearing and that Jacobs had not been prejudiced by violation of the rule, Justice Garibaldi applied the harmless-error rule and refused to remand the
matter for another disciplinary hearing. Id. at *4. Having reconciled Jacobs' claim with regard to the hearing officer's violation of
the 24-hour rule, the court proceeded to address Jacobs' remaining claims. Id. Dismissing Jacobs' claim that he was denied the
right to call witnesses and present evidence on his own behalf, the
majority determined that Jacobs never attempted to call any witnesses or present any such evidence. Id.
Likewise, considering Jacobs' claim that he was unable to investigate fully or prepare his defense and that he should have received the statements of inmate witnesses, the majority reaffirmed
section 1OA:4-9.5(e) of the Code which provides that an inmate
shall not receive a copy of the investigation report. Id. Crediting
the sworn statement of the Assistant Commissioner of the DOC,
Justice Garibaldi recognized that such a procedure would compromise prison security due to the threat of retaliation by the accused.
Id. Acknowledging, however, that section 1OA:4-9.14(b) of the
Code permits the denial of confrontation and cross-examination of
witnesses only if such examination would be unduly hazardous to
prison safety, the court recommended that the DOC promulgate a
regulation allowing charged inmates to receive witness statements
provided such disclosure does not compromise prison safety. Id. at
*5.
The majority next addressed Jacobs' claim that because he was
never informed of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, he could not have waived those rights. Id. Acknowledging
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that constitutional rights can only protect inmates who are aware of
those rights, Justice Garibaldi held that inmates should be informed of their right to remain silent, to make statements regarding the charges, to obtain "use immunity," and to confront and
cross-examine witnesses. Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding
the court's inability to ascertain whether Jacobs was in fact informed of his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the
court concluded that no prejudice could have resulted from a lack
of notice because the testimony of Jacobs' witnesses did not support his position. Id. The majority noted, however, that in future
cases an inmate will be deemed informed of his rights only upon
signing the amended Adjudication Form, which the court prescribed in McDonald, a companion case decided the same day as
Jacobs. Id. (citation omitted).
Finally, Justice Garibaldi addressed Jacobs' remaining claim
that the evidence against him was insufficient to support the
charge that he threatened Officer Hawkins. Id. The justice stated
that the threatening nature of a remark is determined by an objective inquiry as to whether that remark conveys a basis for fear. Id.
Essentially, the court determined that when the nature of an inmate's words reasonably convey the fear of death to the ordinary
listener, then such words constitute a threat of bodily harm which
is punishable under DOC regulations. Id. (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 10A:4-4.1 (a)*005).
Acknowledging that the testimony of all of the witnesses, as
well as Jacobs' own testimony, supported the hearing officer's conclusion that Jacobs' threatened Officer Hawkins, Justice Garibaldi
determined that Jacobs' remarks did constitute a threat. Id. at *5,
*6 (quotations omitted).
In a sharp dissent, Justice Stein asserted that absent an informed waiver, the 24-hour rule was an essential element ofJacobs'
due process rights and that violation of the rule warranted a vacation of the hearing officer's decision and a remand for a new hearing. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting). The justice criticized the majority
for characterizing the DOC error as harmless despite the constitutional dimensions of the 24-hour rule. Id.
Like the majority, the dissent discussed the history and evolution of the 24-hour rule and its constitutional parameters. Id. at *7
(Stein, J., dissenting). Departing from the court's analysis, however, the dissent disagreed with the majority's characterization that
the 24-hour rule was not an essential right of due process. Id. at *9
(Stein, J., dissenting). Buttressing the dissent's position and em-
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phasizing the essential nature of the 24-hour rule, Justice Stein discussed other jurisdictions which had set aside imposed sanctions
and, in some instances, assessed damages for 24-hour rule violations. Id. at *8 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In addition, discrediting the majority's contention thatJacobs had waived
his due process rights when he failed to request additional preparation time, the dissent explained that, in as much as a waiver is a
voluntary relinquishment of a known right, Jacobs could not have
waived the violation because he was unaware that the right was being violated. Id. at *9 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quotation and citation
omitted). Therefore, the justice concluded that there was no justification for diluting a prisoner's due process rights through application of the harmless-error rule. Id.
Continuing the dissent's attack on the majority's rationale, Justice Stein maintained that the majority failed to recognize that the
24-hour rule is a minimal protection which has already been
watered down to reflect the unique requirements of the prison environment. Id. Justice Stein asserted that the 24-hour rule was a
mutual accommodation, balancing the needs of inmate discipline
against prisoners' due process rights. Id. According to the dissent,
this mutual accommodation is reflected in the mandatory 24-hour
rule. Id. (citing N.J. Admin. Code § 1OA:4-9.2). Thus, Justice Stein
believed that the majority, in affirmingJacobs' sentence, undervalued the importance of strict compliance with minimal constitutional protections, undermined the purpose of the 24-hour rule,
and overestimated the significance of affirming Jacobs' sanctions.
Id.
Concluding, the dissent chastised the majority for ignoring a
clear violation of the 24-hour rule simply because the record established Jacobs' guilt. Id. at *10 (Stein, J., dissenting). In so doing,
Justice Stein reasoned, the court dishonored the principle that no
iron curtain is to be drawn between this nation's prisons and the
Constitution. Id. (citation omitted). Continuing, the justice proclaimed that the majority's holding demonstrates the notion that
determinations of guilt are more significant than abridgements of
prisoners' due process rights. Id. Thus, Justice Stein concluded
that the majority's decision reflects a value judgment which overlooks the purpose of due process rights in prison disciplinary hearings, which is to ensure that disciplinary hearings are conducted
fairly and that adequate time is allotted for the charged inmate to
prepare a defense. Id.
In an otherwise murky opinion, Justice Garibaldi directed the
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promulgation of certain DOC procedures which will ensure an inmate's right to prepare an adequate defense for a disciplinary hearing. By amending the Adjudication Form of Disciplinary Charges
and suggesting the release of witness statements, the court has better balanced the needs of the prison system and the rights of the
inmate. Nonetheless, the majority opinion highlights the dearth of
rights available to charged prison inmates and demonstrates the
troubling proposition that prison safety is often paramount to the
prisoner's constitutional or regulatory rights.
If an inmate's right to due process must yield to the need to
ensure prison safety, the courts must strictly enforce those few
rights that are accorded to inmates. Unfortunately, the majority
failed to accept its responsibility when it held that harmless-error
analysis applies to violations of the 24-hour rule because it is not an
essential or fundamental right. Furthermore, although the majority emphasized the mandatory nature of the 24-hour rule, the court
failed to require full and strict compliance. Without a mandate of
strict compliance, inmate rights will undoubtedly continue to be
violated in the prison system. The dissent aptly recognized that
prisoners live in a unique environment of limited freedoms. Id. at
*9 (Stein, J., dissenting). Regretfully, the majority did not recognize that this is all the more reason to strictly protect the few
"watered down" rights that prisoners still have.
Douglas Friedman

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST

AMENDMENT-AN

INJUNCTION

PROTECTING RESIDENTIAL PRIVACY FROM PROTESTORS MAY NOT

RESTRICT

MORE SPEECH THAN NECESSARY-Murray v. Lawson,

138 N.J. 206, 649 A.2d 1253 (1994).
Plaintiffs, Dr. Elrick Murray and his wife, lived with their three
children in Westfield, NewJersey. Id. at 212, 649 A.2d at 1256. Dr.
Murray, an obstetrician and gynecologist, performed abortions at
several clinics and hospitals. The defendants had, in the past, regularly conducted anti-abortion protests in front of one of these clin-
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ics. On January 20, 1991, however, fifty-seven demonstrators
picketed plaintiffs' residence by carrying signs with inflammatory
language and walking in front of the homes of plaintiffs and several neighbors.
In February 1991, plaintiffs commenced an action in the chancery division for monetary damages and for an injunctive order enjoining the protesters from picketing in their neighborhood. Id. at
213, 649 A.2d at 1256-57. After three hearings, the chancery court
issued a temporary restraining order that limited the number of
defendants allowed to picket to two people, once every three weeks
for an hour at a time as well as curbing some of the more inflammatory words contained in the signs. Id., 649 A.2d at 1257. In July
1991, the chancery court replaced the temporary restraining order
with a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants and affiliated
protesters from picketing in any fashion within 300 feet of plaintiffs' residence. Id. at 214, 649 A.2d at 1257. The chancery division
rejected plaintiffs' prayer for money damages based on claims of
disruption of use and enjoyment of property, damage to reputation, and invasion of property. Id.
Defendants appealed the court's judgment, but plaintiffs did
not challenge the trial court's denial of monetary damages. Id.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the
chancery division's 300-foot restriction on the grounds that the issuance of such injunction was within the trial court's authority and
did not violate defendants' First Amendment rights to free speech.
Id. (citing Murray v. Lawson, 264 N.J. Super 17, 624 A.2d 3 (App.
Div. 1933)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted defendants' petition
for certification and affirmed the appellate division's order upholding the injunction issued by the chancery Court. Id. (citing
Murray v. Lawson, 133 N.J. 445, 627 A.2d 1149 (1993)). The
supreme court agreed that the 300-foot restriction was a permissible limitation of defendants' speech in terms of time, place and
manner. Id. (citing Murray v. Lawson, 136 N.J. 32, 642 A.2d 338
(1994)). The court deemed the injunctive order content neutral
inasmuch as the trial court did not impose it on the basis of defendants' anti-abortion views, but rather because of the manner in
which defendants had encroached upon plaintiffs residential privacy. Id. at 215, 649 A.2d at 1257 (citing Murray v. Lawson, 136 N.J.
at 45-46, 642 A.2d 338). Additionally, the court highlighted that
the safeguarding of residential privacy is a government interest of
sufficient significance to justify injunctive orders. Id. (citing Frisbee
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v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)). Lastly, the court found that
the chancery division had narrowly tailored the 300-foot injunction
to further such an interest. Id. (citing Murray, 136 N.J. at 51-53,
642 A.2d 338).
Defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari. Id. at 211, 649 A.2d at 1256. The United States
Supreme Court, having decided a similar case subsequent to the
New Jersey Supreme Court's affirmance in Murray, granted certiorari. Id. In the United States Supreme Court's decision of Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc., the Court held that a similar 300-foot
injunction was impermissible. See id. (citing Madsen v. Women's
Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994)). Consequently, the United States Supreme Court vacated the New Jersey
Supreme Court's judgment and remanded the case for a determination in light of the stricter constitutional standards set forth in
Madsen. Id. (citing Murray v. Lawson, _ U.S. _, 115 S. Ct. 44,
(1994)).
On remand the New Jersey Supreme Court, in an unanimous
opinion authored by Justice Clifford, began by outlining the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Madsen. Id. at 215, 649
A.2d at 1258. The court identified that the applicable test for evaluating content-neutral injunctions, as set forth by the Madsen majority, was not one of strict scrutiny, but rather whether an
injunction presents more of a burden on speech than necessary to
serve significant government interests. Id. at 218-19, 649 A.2d at
1259 (quoting Madsen, -

U.S.

__,

114 S. Ct. at 2525).

The court

quoted Madsen's determination that a 300-foot zone had an overbroad effect on pickets in a residential neighborhood. Id. at 220,
649 A.2d at 1260 (quoting Madsen, _ U.S. _,

114 S. Ct. at 2529).

In turning to the merits of the Murray injunction, the court
first addressed defendants' claim that Madsen is inapplicable because the injunction at bar constitutes a presumptively unconstitutional "prior restraint" on speech. Id. at 221, 649 A.2d at 1261.
Prior restraints, the court noted, are judicial or administrative orders which forbid communications in advance of their occurrence.
Id. at 221-22, 649 A.2d at 1261 (quotations omitted). Noting that
the United States Supreme Court has considered numerous factors
in deciding whether restrictions are prior restraints, the NewJersey
Supreme Court first focused on the determination of whether the
restraint in question entirely obviates the conveyance of a given
message. Id. at 222, 649 A.2d at 1261 (citations omitted). The injunction at issue, the court noted, did not entirely prevent the ex-
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pression of the anti-abortionist defendants' message. Id. at 223,
649 A.2d at 1262. Rather, the court determined, the prohibition
was merely one of spatial restraint. Id. Further, the court cited
amicus curiae, emphasizing that certain types of expression other
than picketing were allowed even within the 300-foot zone. Id. at
223-24, 649 A.2d at 1262. A second factor that Justice Clifford
identified in determining whether an injunction is a prior restraint, is whether the injunction is issued based on the content of
the message. Id. at 224, 649 A.2d at 1262 (citations omitted). Despite defendants' assertions to the contrary, the court concluded
that the injunction issued by the chancery division was not content
motivated, but rather was issued to protect the state interest of residential privacy from defendants' intrusive conduct. Id. at 224-25,
649 A.2d at 1262-63 (citations omitted).
The court next turned to the issue of whether the injunction
that had been previously upheld would survive the stricter standard
set forth in Madsen. Id. at 226-27, 649 A.2d at 1264. While recognizing that the trial court had established an extensive record, Justice Clifford indicated that the record did not include an
explanation of why the chancery court specifically chose a 300-foot
picket-free zone. Id. at 231, 649 A.2d at 1266. Defendants had asserted, the court related, that the trial court's restrictions were
based on large picket-free zones prescribed by other courts. Id. at
232, 649 A.2d at 1267. Although acknowledging that it is appropriate for trial courts to look for guidance to other courts' decisions
on similar issues, Justice Clifford stressed the importance of crafting injunctions on fact-specific grounds. Id. (citing Horizon Health
Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 148, 638 A.2d 1260 (1994)).
The circumstances of the case, the court concluded, did not
warrant the imposition of a 300-foot restriction on the anti-abortionist's picketing. Id. Justice Clifford found that under the 300foot ban, the demonstrators would not even be within the plaintiffs
view while plaintiffs remained in their home or yard. Id. The court
decided that, as a practical matter, it was not necessary to render
plaintiffs unaware of all protests in order to protect their residential privacy. Id. at 232-33, 649 A.2d at 1267. The court thus resolved that it was appropriate, under the facts of the case, to modify
the injunction issued by the chancery division. Id. at 233, 649 A.2d
at 1267. In doing so, Justice Clifford invoked the well-established
authority of appellate courts to substantively modify injunctions.
Id. (citing Horizon Health Ctr., 135 N.J. at 148, 638 A.2d 1260)
(other citations omitted).
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The court rejected defendants' argument that no distance limitation should be imposed at all because of the lack of conductbased factors (such as prior unlawful or disorderly conduct). Id. at
233-34, 649 A.2d at 1267-68. Justice Clifford explained that the
court's reading of Madsen allowed limited picket-free zones despite
the absence of conduct-based determinants. Id. at 234, 649 A.2d at
1267-68. Additionally, the supreme court highlighted the fact that
a zone wherein picketing was completely forbidden would be easier to enforce than the more complicated restrictions proposed by
defendants and contained in an amicus brief submitted by the
American Civil Liberties Union. Id., 649 A.2d at 1268.
The court surmised that a 100-foot zone would be sufficient to
protect plaintiffs' interests in securing their residential privacy. Id.
Under such circumstances, the court reasoned, the Murray family
will have domestic tranquility within their house; however, upon
leaving their residence, they will be made aware of the protests
one-and-one-half lots away. Id. at 234-35, 649 A.2d at 1268. In an
effort to balance the competing interests of the parties, the court
limited the number of protestors to ten at a time. Id. at 235, 649
A.2d at 1268. Justice Clifford determined that a larger number
would generate a feeling of besiegement on behalf of the plaintiffs,
whereas a smaller number might unfairly reduce the public perception of defendants' message to that of a mere fringe viewpoint.
Id. The court further enjoined defendants from protesting more
than once every two weeks in order to allow them to communicate
their views without unduly subjecting plaintiffs to constant protests.
Id. Finally, the court imposed a one hour picketing time-limitation, consistent with defendants' statements at oral argument to
the effect that they would not have wanted to picket plaintiffs' residence for more than one or one-and-one-half hours per demonstration. Id.
The injunction thus modified, the court affirmed the appellate division's judgment, which upheld the chancery divisions equitable order. Id. In doing so, the court ensured that there was no
more interference with defendants' speech than was necessary
under the circumstances. Id. at 234, 649 A.2d at 1268.
To a degree, the United States Supreme Court's remand tied
the NewJersey court's hands inasmuch as Madsen all but precluded
an affirmance of an injunction prescribing a 300-foot picket free
zone. The court, however, was not without discretion to fashion an
equitable remedy and, in it's own words, seized upon Madsen's "invitation" to impose limitations on time, duration and the number
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of protestors. In.examining the merits of the case, the court necessarily weighed the competing interests of defendants, plaintiffs and
plaintiffs' residential neighbors. It is obvious, however, that in
modifying the injunction, the court put the primary emphasis on
protecting the interests of residential privacy, and did so to the detriment of defendants' speech.
The court offered that the modified injunction, albeit more
limiting in terms of frequency, duration and number of protestors,
allowed defendants, by, virtue of proximity, to deliver their message
more effectively. In practical terms, however, the aforestated limitations served to considerably diminish the anti-abortionist's impact on the residential neighborhood. Although the protests are
focused more directly at plaintiff's home, they are done so under
much more restrictive conditions. It can be argued, in fact, that
plaintiffs were never the real targets of defendants' protests. The
true intended recipients of the demonstrator's message may have
been other members of the neighborhood as evidenced by the dissemination of anti-abortion literature and instances of verbal contact with plaintiffs' neighbors.
Therefore, whereas the United States Supreme Court's remand ostensibly called for a lesser impact on defendants' speech,
the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted the "invitation" offered in
Madsen and further restricted the anti-abortion protests. In so doing, the court reduced defendants' messages to relatively infrequent intrusions upon the residential areas, for shorter durations
and with fewer protestors. Perhaps defendants now wish that certiorari had been denied.
Michael S. Rubin
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TORT LAW-WoRKERs' COMPENSATION AcT IMMUNITY-A CORPORATION IS NOT ENTITLED TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION
MUNITY

BASED

ON THE IMMUNITY

OF ITS EMPLOYEE

AFFILIATED COMPANY-V/b v. G.E. Capital Corp.,

ACT IMOR AN

1995 WL

29351 (N.J. Jan. 24, 1995).
On July 17, 1989, Charles Volb ("Volb") was killed when he
was run over by a dump truck operated by defendant Ronald Lee
("Lee"). 1995 WL 29351, *1 (N.J. Jan. 24, 1995). At the time of
the accident, Lee was an employee of defendant T.D.E. Services,
Inc. ("T.D.E."). Volb was an employee of J.H. Reid Construction
Company ("J.H. Reid"). T.D.E. was an affiliate ofJ.H. Reid, which
employed certain union workers to perform atJ.H. Reid construction sites. Through this set-up, J.H. Reid engaged in "double
breasting," which allowed it to operate one entity governed by a
collective bargaining agreement and one without. Id. (citation
omitted). Linda Volb, the deceased's wife, was awarded Workers'
Compensation benefits againstJ.H. Reid. Id. at *2. Subsequently,
she filed a wrongful death action against Lee and T.D.E.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted Lee
and T.D.E.'s separate motions for summary judgment. Id. The
trial court decided Lee's motion based on J.H. Reid's control over
his actions. Id. The court, however, granted T.D.E.'s motion without opinion. Id. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the trial court's decision. Id. Subsequently, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to address the issue of
T.D.E.'s immunity from tort liability for the negligence of Lee. Id.
at *1, *2 (citing Volb v. G.E. Capital Corp., 134 N.J. 478 (1993)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in a decision authored byJustice Stein, reversed the lower court decision and held that T.D.E.
was not entitled to Workers' Compensation Act immunity either
through its employee, Lee, or through its affiliate company, J.H.
Reid. Id. at *3, *6. In reaching the decision, the court first analyzed whether T.D.E. should be granted immunity due to Lee's status as a J.H. Reid special employee. Id. at *2. The justice
recognized that New Jersey had adopted Professor Larson's three
step test for defining a special employee. Id. The court noted that
a special employee falls within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act when: (1) the special employer expressly or impliedly contracts with the employee; (2) the employee is hired to
do essentially the special employer's work; and (3) the special employer controls the work being performed. Id. The court acknowl-
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edged that the control factor was predominant in the analysis and
agreed with the trial court's finding that Lee was aJ.H. Reid special
employee. Id. at *2, *3. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
tort action by Volb's estate against Lee was barred by the Workers'
Compensation Act. Id. at *3 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8).
The court declared, however, that it did not follow that Lee's
employer, T.D.'E., was also immune from liability. Id. The justice
stated that Volb was neither a regular nor special employee of
T.D.E. Id. at *4. In addition,Justice Stein noted, T.D.E. could not
benefit from Lee's immunity because it did not pay Workers' Compensation benefits to Volb's estate. Id. Because this was an issue of
first impression in New Jersey, the court analyzed the holdings of
other jurisdictions. Id. The justice determined that California,
Kansas, Michigan, and Alaska had previously concluded that it was
improper for a defendant, who had not contributed to Workers'
Compensation benefits, to be immune from respondeat superior
liability. Id. at *4-6 (citations omitted). This conclusion, the court
declared, was in accordance with New Jersey's policy that a principal can be held liable for an agent's action, regardless of the
agent's immunity. Id. at *6 (citation omitted). Consequently, the
justice held that T.D.E. was not derivatively immune from suit
based on its employee Lee's immunity. Id.
Next, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether
T.D.E. would qualify for Workers' Compensation Act immunity
based on the immunity of its affiliate company, J.H. Reid. Id. The
court posited that under the majority rule, applied by the courts of
other states and federal courts, Workers' Compensation immunity
would be denied because the separate identities of affiliated corporations should be upheld. Id. at *6-7 (citation omitted). Even the
minority view, the court propounded, did not afford immunity
where the defendant is an affiliate or subsidiary, rather than a parent company. Id. at *7-8.
The court then analyzed the only two cases in New Jersey
which had addressed Workers' Compensation immunity based on
corporate affiliation. Id. at *9. In Vernon v. Supermarket Services
Corp., the court stated, a sister subsidiary corporation was held not
to be entitled to immunity because tort liability was one of the burdens of deciding to incorporate. Id. (citing Vernon v. Supermarket
Serv. Corp., 250 N.J. Super. 8, 10 (App. Div. 1991)). Similarly, in
Mingin v. Continental Can Co., Justice Stein noted, Workers' Compensation immunity was denied an affiliated company because the
court determined that the separate identities of the corporations
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should not be ignored. Id. (citing Mingin v. Continental Can Co.,
171 N.J. Super. 148, 150-52 (Law Div. 1979)).
While the court acknowledged that the Legislature could enact a more liberal enterprise-based Workers' Compensation immunity, the justice would not second-guess a corporation's decision to
incorporate. Id. Accordingly, Justice Stein held that there was no
basis for extending the Workers' Compensation immunity of J.H.
Reid to its affiliate T.D.E. Id.
Finally, the New Jersey Supreme Court state that whether
T.D.E. was liable for Lee's actions under respondeat superior had
not been decided. Id. at *10. The court stated that the decision
was one for the trial court. Id. The justice, however, reviewed the
pertinent authorities as guidance for the lower court. Id. Justice
Stein propounded that the courts in the United States were divided
with regard to the proper standard for respondeat superior liability. Id. After an analysis of New Jersey case law, the court concluded that a general employer remains liable for its employee,
even if borrowed by another employer, as long as the employee is
performing the business of the general employer. Id. at *11 (citations omitted). Therefore, the justice asserted that it was for the
trial court to decide whether Lee was furthering the business of
T.D.E., his general employer, when the accident occurred. Id. at
*13. Accordingly, Justice Stein reversed the decision of the appellate court, and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. ChiefJustice Wilentz and Justice Handler joined the opinion. Id. Justices
O'Hern and Coleman did not participate. Id.
Justice Pollock, joined by Justice Garibaldi, however, authored
a dissent. Id. (Pollock, J., dissenting). The dissent agreed that Lee,
as a special employee ofJ.H. Reid, was protected by Workers' Compensation Act immunity. Id. at *14 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice
Pollock posited, however, that T.D.E. should also be afforded immunity because of its lack of control over Lee. Id. An employer
who does not control its employee, the dissent propounded,
should not be liable for risks which it cannot avoid. Id. at *15 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Furthermore, the justice disagreed with the court's imposition
of respondeat superior liability on general employers when their
employees are furthering the employer's interests. Id. at *16 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice asserted that traditional respondeat superior liability only turns on the amount of control an
employer has on its employees. Id.
Even applying the court's new standard, Justice Pollock deter-
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mined that T.D.E. should not be held liable for the acts of Lee. Id.
at *17 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The dissent declared that no case
in New Jersey had ever imposed liability on an employer for the
acts of an employee while under the exclusive control of a special
employer. Id.
Finally, the dissent concluded that the trial court had already
decided that T.D.E. was not liable because Lee was exclusively controlled byJ.H. Reid. Id. at *18 (Pollock,J., dissenting). Therefore,
the justice stated that it was not necessary to remand the case to the
law division. Id. at *19 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
The court's decision to deny Workers' Compensation Act immunity to an affiliate company is equitable when the affiliate does
not contribute to Workers' Compensation benefits. The injured
employee's ability to sue for an amount beyond Workers' Compensation, however, appears to defeat the purpose of the Act. Allowing the injured employee to sue an affiliate company increases
the number of employee-employer law suits and diminishes the
company's available funds. Nevertheless, the court's decision is in
accord with the majority of states that have addressed this issue.
Though following the majority view, the court unnecessarily
delves into an analysis of respondeat superior liability. As the dissent acknowledges, this dicta is not pertinent to the court's decision. In addition, while the court purportedly makes no decision
on the respondeat superior issue, it implies that T.D.E. is liable for
Lee's actions. Therefore, while ostensibly remanding the case to
the trial court, in actuality the supreme court has decided the outcome of the case.
Finally, while the court's decision seems controversial, it was
not decided by a majority of the New Jersey Supreme Court. With
a number of justices not participating in the decision, the issue is
not well-settled.
Kerme Restieri-Heslin

